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From the Nation to the People  o f  a Potent ial  
New Histor i ca l  Bloc :  Rethinking Popular 
Sovere ignty through Gramsci  
 
Panagiotis Sotiris 
 
 
Introduction 
The very notion of sovereignty and all the political notions 
associated with it have been facing a series of important challenges, 
especially in Europe. On the one hand we have all the recent 
developments in the construction of the European Project and the 
entrance to the era of the ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ that 
represent an even more aggressive version of the reduced 
sovereignty that has been, one way or the other, at the centre of 
European Integration from the beginning. The very notion that a 
country, such as Greece and to a lesser degree Ireland or Portugal, 
can be put under supervision and surveillance, with all major policy 
decisions being referred to the endless negotiations with the 
European institutions, exemplifies this tendency. From the euro as 
a form of ceding of national monetary sovereignty to the Treaties 
that give priority to European Institutions and the new 
mechanisms of disciplinary supervision of member states’ 
economies, exemplified in the Greek experience, the European 
Integration process has been a process of imposition of a condition 
of reduced and limited sovereignty, affecting not only ‘peripheral 
countries’ but also countries of the EU core. Moreover, these 
developments make sovereignty a particular exigency, in the sense 
that any break with austerity and neoliberalism has to take the form 
of the exercise of a sovereign collective will over other institutional 
constraints, such as the terms of the EU treaties, the role of the 
ECB or the financial, monetary and institutional architecture of the 
Eurozone.  
On the other hand, the new waves of migrants and refugees 
arriving in Europe and the anti-immigrant and anti-refugee policies 
of ‘Fortress Europe’ and ‘closed borders’ along with the 
intensification of racism and Islamophobia, both as ideological 
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climate but also as official state policy, have opened up the debate 
regarding the relation between sovereignty and ethnicity.  
The reaction to the current wave of refugees and migrants from 
the entire systemic political spectrum, along with the new versions 
of the ‘clash of civilizations’ associated with an antiterrorist policy 
that is based even more upon Islamophobia, stress the fact that 
questions of identity and ethnicity remain a highly contested terrain 
and that we are facing a return to nationalist and racist discourses 
and practices. The same goes for the recurring insistence of the Far 
Right on a form of sovereignty strongly associated with the nation, 
defined in an almost racist way. 
Recent developments, such as the British vote in favour of 
recuperating the aspects of sovereignty that were ceded as part of 
participation in the European Union, and the political and 
ideological confrontations surrounding the British debate, before 
and after the referendum, also brought forward this challenge. 
Without underestimating all the ugly aspects of xenophobia and 
racism expressed in parts of the Brexit campaign, it is obvious that 
important segments of the working class and other subaltern 
classes saw in the reclaiming of sovereignty a way out of austerity, 
lack of democracy, lack of control over their lives.1  
At the same time, in contemporary debates in the Left one can 
see the tension between different positions but also the tension 
inside each position. For example, the supporters of the position 
that any attempt to establish social and political rights for those 
who fall outside the limits of the nation necessarily implies some 
form of transnational polity have to face the fact that 
contemporary transnational institutions such as the EU in fact not 
only are instrumental in establishing new forms of exclusion (such 
as increased barriers on refugees and migrants and in general non 
‘EU-nationals’), but also play an important part in the erosion of 
any possibility of democratically opting for policies representing 
the collective interests of the subaltern classes.2 At the same time, 
those who support some form of reclaiming sovereignty as part of 
an attempt to re-establish democracy in opposition to neoliberalism 
																																								 																				
1 For a detailed analysis of the different dynamics inside the Leave vote in the British 
Referendum see Watkins 2016. 
2 This was exemplified in Jean Claude-Juncker’s statement that “there can be no choice 
against European treaties” (Sudais 2015). 
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have to face the fact that any return to a traditional ‘national’ 
definition of the collective political body of democracy will lead to 
various forms of exclusion.  
So the question I will try to deal with in this text, albeit in a 
rather schematic way, is whether it is possible to articulate the 
demand to reclaim sovereignty as part of a democratic and 
emancipative project on the part of the subaltern classes, which will 
take account of the fact of mass migration and mass refugee 
movements and avoid falling into the pitfalls of varieties of 
nationalism, exclusion and even state-sanctioned racism. But first 
we must see the answers that have been offered so far. 
 
 
1. The limits of neo-Kantian cosmopolitanism 
One is what we might call the Neo-Kantian answer. Kant (1795) 
formulated his conception of cosmopolitan rights in his text on 
perpetual peace when he suggested three interconnected principles 
in order to attain peace in the new international landscape that was 
formed by the emergence of the nation-State: a) that the civil 
constitution of every state must be republican; b) that the rights of 
nations shall be based on a federation of free states; and c) that the 
cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal 
hospitality. As many commentators have already noted,3 one can 
already see here the expression of tensions that we also see today, 
such as the tension between the nation-State and a universal form 
of rights, leading to Kant substituting the fully cosmopolitan right, 
namely a global form of full political rights, with a right of 
hospitality. We also know, both from historical experience and 
from writings such as Hannah Arendt’s, how the contemporary 
international law on migrants and refugees was formed after the 
experience of big masses of stateless populations in the first half of 
the twentieth century and the emergence as a political and juridical 
question of the “right to have rights”. 
 
Man of the twentieth century has become just as emancipated from nature 
as eighteenth-century man was from history. History and nature have become 
equally alien to us, namely, in the sense that the essence of man can no longer 
be comprehended in terms of either category. On the other hand, humanity, 
																																								 																				
3 See for example Benhabib 2004. 
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which for the eighteenth century, in Kantian terminology, was no more than a 
regulative idea, has today become an inescapable fact. This new situation, in 
which “humanity” has in effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to nature 
or history, would mean in this context that the right to have rights, or the right 
of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity 
itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible. For, contrary to the 
best-intentioned humanitarian attempts to obtain new declarations of human 
rights from international organizations, it should be understood that this idea 
transcends the present sphere of international law which still operates in terms 
of reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign states; and, for the 
time being, a sphere that is above the nations does not exist. (Arendt 1958, p. 
298) 
 
Today, the neo-Kantian perspective mainly takes the form of an 
increased emphasis on the emergence of institutional forms of 
transnational political cooperation and the potential creation of 
elements of a global political cooperative and even federative form 
that would guarantee the universal character of basic human rights 
and exactly guarantee the “right to have rights”.  
Jürgen Habermas’ propositions regarding the emergence of a 
postnational configuration presents exactly this tendency. 
Naturally, Habermas is well aware of the neoliberal and 
undemocratic character of the actual construction of European 
Union, yet he sees it as the only way to actually create a 
postnational political form that would guarantee rights and 
reinstate the welfare state, provided that there is an enhancement 
of democratic procedures and forms of postnational political 
education. Habermas’ suggestion that it is possible as part of the 
process of European Integration to see the emergence of 
democratic forms at the European level that could foster the 
development of a cosmopolitan consciousness and forms of truly 
global citizenship is based upon his particular conception of 
democracy itself. Democracy is not the exercise of a collective 
popular will, but rather a complex series of deliberative processes 
as communicative practices that enhance the emergence of more 
rational forms: 
 
Today, the public sovereignty of the people has withdrawn into legally 
institutionalized procedures and the informal, more or less discursive 
opinion- and will-formation made possible by basic rights. I am assuming 
here a network of different communicative forms, which, however, must be 
organized in such a way that one can presume they bind public 
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administration to rational premises. In so doing, they also impose social and 
ecological limits on the economic system, yet without impinging on its inner 
logic. This provides a model of deliberative politics. This model no longer 
starts with the macrosubject of a communal whole but with anonymously 
intermeshing discourses. (Habermas 1996, p. 505) 
 
Then democracy at the European level does not imply the 
emergence of a European people or demos (as collective will and 
identity) but rather the intensification of these processes of 
deliberation in all their complexity.  
 
The European market will set in motion a greater horizontal mobility and 
multiply the contacts among members of different nationalities. In addition to 
this, immigration from Eastern Europe and the poverty-stricken regions of the 
Third World will heighten the multicultural diversity of society. This will no 
doubt give rise to social tensions. But if those tensions are dealt with 
productively, they can foster a political mobilization that will give additional 
impetus to the new endogenous social movements already emergent within 
nation-States – I am thinking of the peace, environmental, and women’s 
movements. These tendencies would strengthen the relevance that public 
issues have for the lifeworld. At the same time, there is a growing pressure of 
problems that can be solved only at a coordinated European level. Under 
these conditions, communication complexes could develop in Europe-wide 
public spheres. These publics would provide a favorable context both for new 
parliamentary bodies of regions that are now in the process of merging and for 
a European Parliament furnished with greater authority. (Habermas 1996, pp. 
506-507) 
 
Habermas is fully aware that at the international level there are 
difficulties even for this communicative and argumentative form of 
deliberation that he offers as an alternative to popular sovereignty 
with the boundaries of the nation-State. 
 
In a politically constituted community organized via a state, this 
compromise formation is more closely meshed with procedures of deliberative 
politics, so that agreements are not simply produced by an equalization of 
interests in terms of power politics. Within the framework of a common 
political culture, negotiation partners also have recourse to common value 
orientations and shared conceptions of justice, which make an understanding 
beyond instrumental-rational agreements possible. But on the international 
level this “thick” communicative embeddedness is missing. (Habermas 2001, 
p. 109) 
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Habermas thinks that we can find new forms of postnational 
unifying identity in exactly this attachment to these democratic 
procedures, at the national and transnational level, which he 
defines as a form of “constitutional patriotism”. 
 
As the examples of multicultural societies like Switzerland and the United 
States demonstrate, a political culture in which constitutional principles can 
take root need by no means depend on all citizens’ sharing the same language 
or the same ethnic and cultural origins. A liberal political culture is only the 
common denominator for a constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus) 
that heightens an awareness of both the diversity and the integrity of the 
different forms of life coexisting in a multicultural society. In a future Federal 
Republic of European States, the same legal principles would also have to be 
interpreted from the perspectives of different national traditions and histories. 
(Habermas 1996, p. 500) 
 
However, it is exactly here that the problem with Habermas’ 
position lies: in his conception of democratic politics. His 
communicative conception of the “categorical imperative”, ever 
since his Theory of Communicative Action, means that, both at the 
national and the international level, he has moved away from 
politics as confrontation or struggle between antagonistic class 
strategies (even if they are articulated as competing versions of 
what is the “collective will” of society), towards a normative and 
procedural conception of politics as attempt towards creating 
optimal conditions of communication and argumentation. 
 
Such a discourse-theoretical understanding of democracy changes the 
theoretical demands placed on the legitimacy conditions for democratic 
politics. A functioning public sphere, the quality of discussion, accessibility, 
and the discursive structure of opinion- and will-formation: all of these could 
never entirely replace conventional procedures for decision-making and 
political representation. But they do tip the balance, from the concrete 
embodiments of sovereign will in persons, votes, and collectives to the 
procedural demands of communicative and decision-making processes. And 
this loosens the conceptual ties between democratic legitimacy and the familiar 
forms of state organization. (Habermas 2001, pp. 110-111) 
 
That is why Habermas tends towards rather modest proposals 
for increased participation of NGOs and social movements in 
negotiation processes, as part of this procedural and 
communicative conception of collective practice.  
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[T]he institutionalized participation of non-governmental organizations in 
the deliberations of international negotiating systems would strengthen the 
legitimacy of the procedure insofar as mid-level transnational decision-making 
processes could then be rendered transparent for national public spheres, and 
thus be reconnected with decision-making procedures at the grassroots level. 
(Habermas 2001, p. 111) 
 
However, the experience of all recent negotiations of 
international agreements and treaties along with the everyday 
functioning of the EU has shown that such deliberations do not 
fundamentally alter the course of things or affect the actual 
decision processes. In certain cases, they are simply attempts to 
offer legitimization to processes that are fundamentally 
authoritarian and undemocratic.  
On her part, Seyla Benhabib has offered a problematized version 
of the Kantian conceptualization of cosmopolitan rights, by means 
of a reading of Arendt’s critical approach to both the nation-State 
and world government. She is aware of what she defines as the 
“paradox of democratic legitimacy”, namely the fact that the rights 
of the subaltern have to be negotiated upon a terrain “flanked by 
human rights on the hand and sovereignty assertions on the other” 
(Benhabib 2004, p. 47). Consequently, what she suggests is a form 
of cosmopolitan federalism, based upon porous – not open – 
borders based upon a combination between the rights of refugees 
and migrants and the acceptance of the continuous existence of 
nation-States.  
 
In the spirit of Kant, therefore, I have pleaded for moral universalism and 
cosmopolitan federalism. I have not advocated open but rather porous borders. I 
have pleaded for first-admittance rights for refugees and asylum-seekers, but 
have accepted the right of democracies to regulate the transition from full 
membership. (Benhabib 2004, p. 220-221) 
 
The main problem with this neo-Kantian approach is, in my 
opinion, two-fold. Faced with the contradiction between the 
abstract universalism of a normative conception of cosmopolitan 
rights, itself based upon the projection of a universal community of 
human beings as subjects, which is obviously unattainable, they 
easily opt for a more realistic approach of trying to guarantee some 
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aspects of these rights as part of actual national or supranational 
configuration, leading to all forms of compromises with current 
policies, policies that in the end run counter to exactly this 
conception of universal rights.  
In this sense, it is exactly the European Union and its evolution 
that up to now offers a very material counterargument to the neo-
Kantian position. The emerging constitutionalism without 
democracy, in the form of a guarantee of basic rights (for ‘EU 
nationals’) that goes hand and in hand with an authoritarian 
erosion of democratic process without precedent, and with the 
dismantling of social rights and the welfare state, offers the 
absolute limit of any attempt to think of European Integration as 
the materialization of Kant’s vision.4  
Moreover, the new forms of exclusion and the new barriers to 
migration and the right to safe passage of refugees make it evident 
that the EU is far from enforcing any kind of cosmopolitan rights. 
Finally, the new forms of anti-terrorist preventive practices such as 
attempts at detecting early signs of ‘radicalization’, along with 
officially treating the Muslim segments of the European working 
classes as potentially ‘dangerous classes’, imply the continuity of 
elements of a colonial ideology and practice, this time turned 
towards the interior of European Union.5 
Some, exemplified by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson’s 
conceptualization of a radical politics of border struggles as 
productions of new commons, have attempted to go beyond the 
normative universalism of this Kantian conception of 
cosmopolitan rights. However, in the end, they cannot avoid the 
oscillation between a radical emphasis on the singularity of 
struggles that create, in their multitudinous plurality, the new 
translations of the common, and an acceptance of the framework 
of European Integration or other institutional forms of 
‘globalization’ as given. This is based upon the premise that many 
struggles can no longer be waged at the level of the national-state: 
 
While the exclusionary dimension of the nation-State, symbolized and 
implemented by the border, is still very much present in the contemporary 
																																								 																				
4 On the evolution of the EU see Anderson 2009; Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Durand (ed.) 2013. 
5 On Islamophobia as an alarming global trend see Kumar 2012; Kundnani 2014; Todd 
2015. 
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world, there still are “defensive” struggles, for instance, for social commons, 
that are fought at the level of the state. This is probably rightly so. But 
independently of what we have written about the structural antinomy between 
the public and the common, the political production of space historically 
associated with the state no longer offers an effective shield against capital. 
This means it is a matter of realism for the political project of the common to 
refuse the idea of positioning itself within existing bounded institutional 
spaces and to look for the necessary production of new political spaces. 
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, p. 303) 
 
This leads to a position that, while it is oriented toward radical 
forms of emancipation that transcend the capitalist horizon, at the 
same time it is ready to accept the possibility of more ‘realist’ 
positions within the framework even of European Integration. 
 
It would be too easy, but no less true, to maintain that the current crisis of 
European integration makes the huge intellectual investments since the early 
1990s in the postnational citizenship emerging in its frame at least over-
proportioned. This is not to say that we do not see a chance for the political 
project of the common in the gaps of official institutional structures, which 
are themselves in-the-making, multilevel, and crisscrossed by multiple crises in 
Europe and elsewhere in the world. We are convinced that social struggles can 
nurture a new political imagination capable of working through current 
processes of regional integration and of opening them toward a reinvention of 
internationalism. (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, p. 305) 
 
In a similar manner we see in Saskia Sassen’s work an attempt to 
re-think the possibility of a “global civil society” not in terms of a 
normative conception but of an articulation of struggles at the 
global level that also has the problem of taking as somewhat given 
the current forms of ‘globalization’, even if the emphasis is on 
struggles rather than institutional forms.  
 
The category of global civil society is, in a way, too general to capture the 
specific transboundary networks and formations connecting or articulating 
multiple places and actors. A focus on these specifics brings “global civil 
society” down to the spaces and practices of daily life, furthered by today’s 
powerful imaginaries around the idea that others around the world are 
engaged in the same struggles. This begins to constitute a sense of global civil 
society that is rooted in the daily spaces of people rather than on some global 
stage. It also means that the poor, those who cannot travel, can be part of 
global civil society. I include here cross-border networks of activists engaged 
in specific localized struggles with an explicit or implicit global agenda and 
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non- cosmopolitan forms of global politics and imaginaries attached to local 
issues and struggles. (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, p. 305) 
 
 
2. Balibar and the contradictions of citizenship 
In light of the above, Étienne Balibar’s attempts to rethink 
questions of citizenship are of great interest. Balibar underlines the 
fact that the exclusionary aspect of nationalism and even racism 
were one pole of the contradiction of the emergence of 
contemporary political forms associated with the nation-State, the 
other being the demand for equality and liberty, what he defines 
with the neologism “equaliberty”.  
 
Here is the extraordinary novelty and at the same time the root of all the 
difficulties, the nub of the contradiction. If one really wants to read it literally, 
the Declaration in fact says that equality is identical to freedom, is equal to 
freedom, and vice versa. Each is the exact measure of the other. This is what I 
propose to call, with a deliberately baroque phrase, the proposition of 
equaliberty – a portmanteau term, impossible and yet possible only as a play 
on words, that alone expresses the central proposition. (Balibar 2014, p. 46) 
 
The key point is a new form of citizenship based upon the 
contradictory identification of rights of citizen and rights of man. 
This new form of citizenship opens up a way for the expansion of 
the very sphere of politics in ways that also enable the political 
participation and demands of the subaltern classes. 
 
[T]he signification of the equation Man = Citizen is not so much the 
definition of a political right as the affirmation of a universal right to politics. 
Formally, at least – but this is the very type of a form that can become a 
material weapon – the Declaration opens an indefinite sphere for the 
politicization of rights claims, each of which reiterates in its own way the 
demand for citizenship or for an institutional, public inscription of freedom 
and equality. The rights claims of workers or of dependents as well as those of 
women or slaves, and later those of the colonized, is inscribed within this 
indefinite opening, as we see in attempts beginning in the revolutionary 
period. (Balibar 2014, p. 50) 
 
Moreover, this emerging new conception of citizenship is also 
accompanied by a new conception of sovereignty based upon this 
new conception of politics, this new politicization of society, this 
new opening up of the political space.  
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As far as sovereignty is concerned, as I have tried to show elsewhere, the 
revolutionary innovation consists precisely in subverting the traditional 
concept by posing the highly paradoxical thesis of an egalitarian sovereignty –
practically a contradiction in terms, but the only way to radically get rid of all 
transcendence and inscribe the political and social order in the element of 
immanence, of the self-constitution of the people. From there, however, 
begins the immediate development of a whole series of contradictions that 
proceed from the fact that so-called civil society and especially the state are 
entirely structured by hierarchies or dependencies that are both indifferent to 
political sovereignty and essential to its institutionalization, even though 
society or the modern city no longer has at its disposal the means of the 
ancient city for neutralizing these contradictions and pushing them out of the 
public sphere, namely, the rigorous compartmentalization of the oikos and the 
polis. (Balibar 2014, p. 42) 
 
However, this new formulation of politics is from the beginning 
traversed by an important contradiction between a politics of 
insurrection, the revolutionary aspect of the emergence of 
democratic politics, and a politics of constitution, the politics 
associated with the State and the established order.  
 
[T]his affirmation introduces an individual oscillation, induces a structural 
equivocation between two obviously antinomic politics: a politics of 
insurrection and a politics of constitution – or, if you prefer, a politics of 
permanent, uninterrupted revolution and a politics of the state as institutional 
order. (Balibar 2014, p.p. 52-53) 
 
It is here that we find the problem with the emergence of the 
Nation as the political and ideological form of the new collective 
subject of democratic politics. Balibar insists that we can witness 
this tension even at the moment of the French Revolution: 
 
The system of Fraternity tends to be doubled into a national fraternity and, 
before long, a statist, revolutionary, social fraternity wherein extreme 
egalitarianism finds expression in communism. The meaning of the Nation 
changes: it no longer means all the citizens in opposition to the monarch and 
the privileged, but the idea of a historical belonging centered on the state. At 
the extreme, through the mythification of language, culture, and national 
traditions, it will become the French version of nationalism, the idea of a 
moral and cultural community founded on institutional traditions. Opposed to 
it, on the contrary, the notion of the people drifts toward the general idea of 
the proletariat as the people’s people. (Balibar 2014, p. 55) 
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For Balibar this tension points to the fact that “political 
modernity comprises two antithetical movements with respect to 
‘anthropological differences’”. On the one hand, we have the 
universalism that “promoted or invented a notion of the citizen 
that implies not only that an individual belongs to a community but 
also that he has access to a system of rights from which no human 
being can be legitimately excluded.” (Balibar 2017, p. 275). On the other 
hand, “modernity enlarges as never before the project of classifying 
human beings precisely in terms of their differences” (Balibar 2017, 
p. 276). This can explain the violence and brutality of modern 
forms of exclusion and racism. 
 
Because the human and the political (the “rights of man” and the “rights of the 
citizen”) are coextensive “by right,” the human being cannot be denied access to citizenship 
unless, contradictorily, he is also excised from humanity. Therefore – and I apologize 
for the brutality of a formulation that is nonetheless all-too-relevant in reality 
because of past and present exclusions based on race, sex, deviance, 
pathologies, to mention only a few – the human being can be denied such 
access only by being reduced to subhumanity or defective humanity. (Balibar 
2017, p. 276) 
 
Consequently, Balibar’s proposition for a “transnational 
citizenship”(Balibar 2003) is an attempt to answer the problems 
associated with racism and exclusion and the grand movements of 
migrants and refugees, at the same time acknowledging the 
persistence of the nation-State and the new challenges posed by the 
emergence of forms like the European Union. This is also evident 
in his attempt to discuss ways to “democratize democracy” in ways 
that incorporate contemporary struggles, treating insurrection as 
the “active modality of citizenship: the modality that it brings into 
action.” (Balibar 2015, p. 131). The problem is that, although Balibar 
is in no way a naive partisan of European Integration, something 
exemplified in his insistence that “along with the development of a 
formal ‘European Citizenship’, a real ‘European Apartheid’ has 
emerged” (Balibar 2003, p. 121), in the end he attempts to take it 
for granted as the terrain for such a strategy. 
 
 
3. The problems with the neo-republican defence of the nation-State 
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A certain opposition to the above discussed positions comes in 
the form of what we can define as a neo-republican defence of the 
nation-State and of national identities. Here the line of reasoning is 
the following. Despite the rhetoric of globalization, nation-States 
remain indispensable nodes for the reproduction of capitalism. 
Emerging supranational forms, such as the European Union and 
the entire drive towards European Integration tend to undermine 
nation-States in favour of the forces of globalized capital and also 
to erode democracy by sharply reducing the terrain and scope of 
popular sovereignty. Capitalist elites accept this condition of 
limited or eroded sovereignty because they want to be part of 
globalized reproduction of capitalist accumulation. This erosion of 
democracy undermines democracy, because democracy can only be 
an active political condition when there are a demos and a popular 
will that can be exercised in a particular territory. There can be no 
supranational demos and consequently no cosmopolitan 
democracy. 
Up until this point, this neo-republican argument indeed points 
to actual problems with contemporary forms of reduced 
sovereignty and the absence of real democratic process at the level 
of supranational institutional arrangements such as the European 
Union. However, there is another aspect to this argument: the 
association of demos with the nation. According to this argument 
the political body, in order to be a democratic political body, 
requires an element of common culture, history and community, a 
necessary commitment to a common identity. Consequently, the 
argument goes, contemporary ‘multiculturalism’, in the sense of 
mass migration but also in the sense of emergence of a globalized 
mass culture has undermined the necessary common identity and 
common commitment that is the backbone of the emergence of 
the modern forms of popular sovereignty. Some versions of this 
argument have been used by the Far Right in order to defend their 
own version of neo-racist politics, especially in relation to closed 
borders and discriminations against migrants and refugees in the 
name of a return to the necessary supposed ‘purity of the nation’ or 
of the purity of the ‘national culture’.  
In other instances, this discourse distances itself from any 
openly racist arguments, but it does centre upon the need for some 
common elements of political culture that supposedly enable this 
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re-emergence of the demos-people of the nation-State. The French 
version of ‘Republicanism’ offers such a case.6 And it is interesting 
to see the positions of some of the left-wing proponents of neo-
republicanism. 
Perhaps the most telling case is that of Régis Debray. The 
former guerrillero already in 1978 was insisting on the importance of 
the national aspects of any revolutionary sequence: 
 
The reason is that if the masses do make history, and if they are not an 
abstraction roaming around above existing frontiers and languages – if they 
exist only within circumscribed cultural and natural communities – then they 
make history as and where they are, from below and not above, piece-meal 
and not globally. There is no one single history for everybody; the time of 
history is not the same in Tokyo, Paris, Peking and Venezuela. When a world 
revolutionary programme attempts to gather multiplicity into unity and 
rationalize the whole movement, it goes against the historical process itself, for 
the latter proceeds from unity to multiplicity. Things always happen from 
below, multiplicity is always victorious. (Debray 1978, p. 37) 
 
It is obvious that we are still dealing here with an attempt to see 
the national aspects of any potential revolutionary sequence, 
echoing in a certain manner the relation of national and social 
struggles in the revolutionary movements in the Third World. 
However, from the 1980s onwards, Debray’s positions moved 
from the question of revolution to the question of what constitutes 
the reclaiming of the French republican tradition. As Émile Chabal 
has stressed, for Debray the Republic as “a repository of national 
memory, cultural heritage and enlightenment values [...] is the only 
possible bulwark against the decadence of Democracy and the 
warped ethics of financial capitalism” (Chabal 2015, p. 41). More 
recently, he has offered an impressive defence of frontiers in which 
he attacks all those who call for a world without borders as being 
defenders of the economism of the ‘global marketplace’, of 
‘technicism’, of ‘absolutism’ and of imperialism, against which he 
calls for “a right to the frontier”(Debray 2010). 
Another example is the work of Jacques Sapir, a former student 
of Charles Bettelheim, a specialist in the transition from the USSR 
to Russia and one of the fiercest critics of globalization but also of 
																																								 																				
6 For a definition and critique of current neo-republicanism in the French context, see 
Todd 2015. 
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European Integration. However interesting are many of his 
observations regarding globalization, the problems with the 
Eurozone and his critique of the EU, at the same time his positions 
encapsulate the problem with a certain version of the neo-
republican argument. Sapir is careful to avoid any identification of 
the Nation to race or even common origin. What he insists upon is 
the centrality of the people, defined as political body sharing 
common values and not common ancestry. This unity of the 
political body is threatened, according to Sapir, by new forms of 
communitarianism, especially those related to religion. For Sapir 
the attack on sovereignty opens up the way for its dissolution. The 
unity of the people requires secularism, because it is secularism that 
relegates these religious and communitarian elements to the private 
sphere. “We cannot have a people, the base of the political 
construction of popular sovereignty, without secularism which 
confines to the private sphere the divergences upon which no 
discussion can be held” (Sapir 2016, Kindle locations 308-314). 
Sapir refuses any conceptualization of ethnicity in biological terms, 
yet he insists on the need for anyone participating in the nation to 
share the history and the language of any society s/he participates 
in. Consequently, in a certain way he is a posteriori making a certain 
reference to national identity a prerequisite for participation in the 
political process. 
 
Ethnicity [l’ethnie] is a social construction and not a biological reality and 
sometimes it has to do with a discursive myth used to separate one population 
from another. But after we have repeated these truths, we will, nevertheless, 
be confronted with the acquisition of the necessary rules for a life in society by 
those that newly arrive to become part of a population. And it is here that we 
find the frontier between the mythical discourse of a “big replacement” and 
the fact, equally real, of the failure of integration of a part of the immigrant 
populations, because these do not have the references that they could 
assimilate. Integration is a process of assimilation of rules and customs which 
is in part conscious – we make an effort to learn the language and history into 
which we want to integrate into – but it is equally unconscious. For this 
unconscious mechanism to be put into motion there is also need of a 
reference point. Disappearing or effacing this reference point in the name of a 
multiculturalism that only means the tolerance to practices that are very 
different is a real obstacle to this integration. (Sapir 2016, Kindle location 
1058-1067) 
 
International Gramsci Journal No. 6 (2nd Series / Seconda Serie) March / Marzo 2017	 	
	
	
67	
It is here that we see the crucial semantic shift of this neo-
republican defence of the nation. The very notion of common 
culture brings us very close to classical nationalism and it is a well- 
documented fact that most versions of racism in Europe in the 
past decades do not focus on origin but upon sharing of a common 
culture. Sapir is very clear that the formation of a people requires 
common values: “it is clear that without ‘common value’, a human 
community cannot constitute a political community” (Sapir 2016, 
Kindle locations 1542-1544). And here is the problem with this 
position: How can we define these common values? How we deal 
with the fact that in class societies these values represent 
hegemonic strategies? What about the challenge posed by 
colonialism, both in its past but also in its present in the form of 
discrimination against former colonial subjects now living in the 
metropolis.  
Moreover, Sapir is very clear that he considers that there is a 
problem with certain immigrant communities and that he believes 
that they cannot integrate. He thinks that there is a certain segment 
of the immigrant youth that shows elements of anomie and their 
opting of identity reveals the kind of narcissism that Sapir 
associates with fundamentalism. It is in these terms that he 
designates multiculturalism as the enemy, in the sense that he 
thinks that a multiculturalist embracing of heterogeneity 
undermines the convergence in terms of culture of values that is 
necessary for the political construction of the people.  
 
There is here a dialectic that we cannot surpass and with which we are 
condemned to live. If heterogeneity is a state of the political community, its 
constitution in ‘people for itself’ can only be made by means of a convergence 
of aspirations and views on the future. This convergence implies a common 
political culture and this is contradictory with multiculturalism. (Sapir 2016, 
Kindle locations 873-879).  
 
However, despite Sapir’s attempts to offer a conceptualization 
of the political construction of the people of popular sovereignty, 
in the end he opts for a rather classical conception of the Nation, 
along with the State, as the basis of popular sovereignty, a position 
that brings us back to all the classical problems associated with a 
national conception of contemporary societies. 
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Therefore, the idea of separating the people from the nation and from the 
State, even if it is necessary from an analytical point of view, is impossible 
from the point of view of practical result. The people, conceived as political 
community, have no concrete existence outside the State and the nation, even 
if it can consciously, but also unconsciously, transform both. There are 
complex relations between the people, the nation and the State and these 
relations defy simplifications. The constitution of a people united in its will to 
live together and to create in common, even if this will may partly be the fruit 
of institutions that have constructed necessary affects, is indeed the point of 
obligatory passage without which the constitution of a nation will fail. This is 
one of the lessons that we must retain from the centrality of the concept of 
sovereignty. When a population, whatever it is, desires to make something in 
common, there is sovereignty. But from the moment that this population is 
heterogeneous, it helps to move certain questions out of the public space. 
That is why, for many centuries, a necessary alliance pact has been in force 
between sovereignty and secularism. (Sapir 2016, Kindle locations 2829-2838)  
 
Therefore, in the case of Sapir, from the question of the political 
construction of the people, we move back to the nation as 
common culture, history, and language and as the need to exclude 
from the political (and cultural) space of the people certain cultural 
or religious reference points, however important they might be for 
large segments of the subaltern classes of immigrant origin. And in 
the case of Sapir, this can lead to dangerous political associations, 
such as his recent insistence to treat the Far Right Front National as 
a potential part of a broader front in favour of sovereignty.  
In general, it would be unfair to say that this conception of the 
secular and democratic nation as the community of the demos is 
based upon strictly national or racial elements. One might say that 
most supporters of a neo-republican conception of the nation-State 
opt for some form of a performative conception of nationhood. 
For them it is not a question of race, ethnicity or colour, but of the 
performance of certain cultural and discursive elements that 
guarantee the unity of the demos: rationalism, secularism, 
tolerance, multiculturalism and a certain form of feminism. 
Especially the feminist aspect was particularly important in France, 
in the support given by mainstream feminism to repressive 
measures such as the ban on the headscarf in the name of 
liberation of women, despite the opposition from exactly the 
subjects supposed to be liberated (Levy 2010; Boggio Éwanjé-Épée 
and Magliani-Belkacem 2012). However, the end result is the same 
as with ‘typical’ racism: a multiplication of forms of exclusion and 
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an increasing tendency towards treating collective practices, 
cultures, discourses as inappropriate for democratic participation, 
as reasons to forbid the participation in the collective political body 
of the people. 
 
 
4. The colonial trauma at the heart of the nation-State 
Moreover, in the debates on secularism, especially in France with 
all the political confrontations around the notion of laïcité we can 
see the reproduction of elements of a certain Islamophobia and a 
certain reluctance to deal with the colonial past and its continuous 
effectivity in order to understand the forms of contemporary 
racism. The 2003 debate around the question of the scarf brought 
forward the unease of certain segments of the Left, including some 
from the anticapitalist Left, with the reality of the cultural referents 
of subaltern strata of immigrant origin, and the danger that a 
certain kind of neo-republican defence of secularism and laïcité can 
lead to alliances with systemic political forces. Laurent Lévy (2010) 
has offered a very powerful account of these debates. It is also 
important to note that there have also been other important 
contributions recently to these debates that highlight that the 
‘divergences’ in French society that Sapir stressed are not the result 
of the supposed narcissistic attachment of immigrant youth to 
fundamentalism but of the actual continuation of colonialism inside 
French society, not only in the form of ideological prejudice but 
also of real exclusion. Sadri Khiari offers an important account of 
the history of racism and discrimination in France and how racism 
was in fact a class political strategy on the part of the dominant 
classes (Khiari 2009). Moreover, recent developments and anti-
racist and anti-colonial struggles have shown that integration is not 
an attempt towards creating a more open political community but 
in reality a way to enhance exclusion and separation. It is obvious 
that we are also dealing here with the fact that, from the very 
beginning, colonialism was the dark side of the construction of the 
modern nation-State, especially in Europe, exemplified in the way 
in which both the war and the liberation of Algeria was perceived 
in France. In a similar manner, contemporary interventions on the 
part of radical antiracism especially in France, such as the collective 
effort of the current associated with the Parti des Indigènes de la 
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République (Bouteldja and Khiari 2012), offer an important 
reminder of the persistence of a neo-colonial form of state-induced 
racism still active at the heart of the European Project. Moreover, 
they make it evident that contemporary forms of attacks against the 
Muslim segments of the working classes of Europe, supposedly in 
the name of containing ‘radical Islam’, in fact represent class 
strategies in order to keep them in a very particular condition of 
subalternity. However, what is most worrying is the tendency by 
certain segments of the radical Left, including the anticapitalist left, 
to accept some of the basic tenets of such positions, exemplified in 
the support of the Left of certain forms of ‘forced emancipation’ in 
the name of the secular state.  
However, the same trauma at the heart of the modern nation-
State could also be observed elsewhere. Hannah Arendt, a critical 
witness to one of the most important recent conscious attempts at 
nation-building, namely the formation of modern Israel, offered 
important warnings in the 1940s about the association of popular 
sovereignty and nationalism, especially in cases where the political 
establishment of the nation was also based on a founding moment 
of exclusion and oppression of other people already there (Arendt 
2007). 
 
 
5. Gramsci’s thinking on the national-popular 
So the question remains: is it possible to conceive of some form 
of recuperation of popular sovereignty, without having to fall back 
into some form of nationalism or any variety of the political and 
ideological constructions that tend to reproduce exclusion or neo-
colonial exclusion? 
One way to deal with this is by a return to Gramsci. Gramsci’s 
preoccupation with the emergence of what he defined the national-
popular will is well known.7 For Gramsci the “national-popular” 
collective will represents a form of modern statehood associated 
with the revolutionary “Jacobin” tradition of the bourgeoisie, an 
element missing from the emergence of the Italian State, in many 
instances. 
 
																																								 																				
7 On the broader notion of the “national-popular” in Gramsci, from literature to politics, 
see Durante 2009. 
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One of the first sections must precisely be devoted to the “collective will”, 
posing the question in the following terms: “When can the conditions for 
awakening and developing a national-popular collective will be said to exist?” 
Hence an historical (economic) analysis of the social structure of the given 
country and a “dramatic” representation of the attempts made in the course of 
the centuries to awaken this will, together with the reasons for the successive 
failures. Why was there no absolute monarchy in Italy in Machiavelli’s time? 
One has to go back to the Roman Empire (the language question, problem of 
the intellectuals, etc.), and understand the function of the mediaeval 
Communes, the significance of Catholicism etc. In short, one has to make an 
outline of the whole history of Italy – in synthesis, but accurate.  
The reason for the failures of the successive attempts to create a national-
popular collective will is to be sought in the existence of certain specific social 
groups which were formed at the dissolution of the Communal bourgeoisie; in 
the particular character of other groups which reflect the international 
function of Italy as seat of the Church and depositary of the Holy Roman 
Empire; and so on. [...] An effective Jacobin force was always missing, and 
could not be constituted; and it was precisely such a Jacobin force which in 
other nations awakened and organised the national-popular collective will, and 
founded the modem States. (Q 13, §1; SPN, pp. 130-131)  
 
However, Gramsci stresses the fact that this kind of formation 
of the national-popular will represents only a particular 
‘revolutionary’ phase of the bourgeoisie and that “[a]ll history from 
1815 onwards shows the efforts of the traditional classes to 
prevent the formation of a collective will of this kind, and to 
maintain ‘economic-corporate’ power in an international system of 
passive equilibrium” (Q 13, §1; SPN, p. 132).  
Gramsci uses the French example and the particular importance 
of the role of the subaltern classes in the formation of the national-
popular will in order to emphasize the absence of such an element 
in the Italian case. However schematic his conceptualization of the 
French case might be, the important point lies in his attempt to 
emphasize the possibilities of alternative forms of formation of the 
national-popular element, depending upon different national 
histories.  
 
The works of French historians and French culture in general have been 
able to develop and become ‘national-popular’ because of the very complexity 
and variety of French political history in the last 150 years. [...] A unilinear 
national ‘hagiography’ is impossible: any attempt of this sort appears 
immediately sectarian, false, utopian, and anti-national because one is forced to 
cut out or undervalue unforgettable pages of national history (see Maurras’ 
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current line and Bainville’s miserable history of France). That is why the 
permanent element of these political variations, the people-nation, has become 
the protagonist of French history. Hence a type of political and cultural 
nationalism that goes beyond the bounds of the strictly nationalist parties and 
impregnates the whole culture. Hence also a close and dependent relationship 
between people-nation and intellectuals. 
There is nothing of the sort in Italy, where one must search the past by 
torchlight to discover national feeling, and move with the aid of distinctions, 
interpretations, and discreet silences. [...] Consequently, in the history of the 
nineteenth century, there could not have been national unity, since the 
permanent element, the people-nation, was missing. On the one hand, the 
dynastic element had to prevail given the support it received from the state 
apparatus, and the divergent political currents could not have had a shared 
minimum objective. [...] Due to this position of theirs, the intellectuals had to 
distinguish themselves from the people, place themselves outside, create or 
reinforce among themselves a spirit of caste and have a deep distrust of the 
people, feeling them to be foreign, fearing them, because, in reality, the people 
were something unknown, a mysterious hydra with innumerable heads.  
[...] But one must not deny that many steps forward have been taken in 
every sense: to do so would be to fall into an opposite rhetoric. On the 
contrary, many intellectual movements, especially before the war, attempted to 
renew the culture, strip away its rhetoric and bring it nearer to the people, in 
other words nationalize it. (The two tendencies could be called nation-people 
and nation-rhetoric.) (Q 3, §82; CW, pp. 255-7)  
 
It is interesting to note the distinction that Gramsci makes 
between nation-people (popolo-nazione) and nation-rhetoric, 
which marks exactly the negative version of nationalism, one that 
does not incorporate the popular, the subaltern element. The same 
goes for Gramsci’s critique of any conception of the eternity of the 
nation (an important point taking into consideration the element of 
a perceived historical continuity in the Italian peninsula). “The 
preconception that Italy has always been a nation complicates its 
entire history and requires anti-historical intellectual acrobatics” (Q 
3, §82; CW, pp. 255-7). Hence, we have Gramsci’s denouncement 
of easy nationalist rhetorical constructions. 
 
This fact is the most peremptory confirmation that in Italy writers are 
separated from the public and that the public seeks ‘its’ literature abroad 
because it feels that this literature is more ‘its own’ than the so-called national 
literature. In this fact lies an essential problem of national life. If it is true that 
each century or fraction of a century has its own literature, it is not always true 
that this literature is produced in the same national community. Every people 
has its own literature, but this can come to it from another people, in other 
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words the people in question can be subordinated to the intellectual and moral 
hegemony of other peoples. This is often the most strident paradox for many 
monopolistic tendencies of a nationalistic and repressive character: while they 
make magnificent hegemonic plans, they fail to realize that they are the object 
of foreign hegemonies, just as while they make imperialistic plans, they are in 
fact the object of other imperialisms. (Q 23, §57; CW, p. 255) 
  
For Gramsci the national element cannot be identified with the 
nationalistic element. The national element, regarding culture and 
ideological production, refers to a particular relation with a national 
history and a historical / cultural environment not with loyalty to a 
national group. One might say that it is an analytic not a 
prescriptive term: 
 
National, in other words, is different from nationalist. Goethe was a 
German ‘national’, Stendhal a French ‘national’, but neither of them was a 
nationalist. An idea is not effective if it is not expressed in some way, 
artistically, that is, particularly. But is a spirit particular in as much as it is 
national? Nationality is a primary particularity, but the great writer is further 
particularized among his fellow countrymen and this second ‘particularity’ is 
not the extension of the first. Renan, as Renan, is by no means a necessary 
consequence of the French spirit. Through his relation to it he is an original 
event, arbitrary and (as Bergson says) unpredictable. And yet, Renan remains 
French, just as man, while being man, remains animal. But his value, as is true 
of man, lies precisely in his difference from the group from which he was 
born. 
It is precisely this that the nationalists do not want. For them the value of 
the masters (great intellectuals) consists in their likeness to the spirit of their 
group, in their loyalty, in their punctual expression of this spirit (which is, 
moreover, defined as the spirit of the masters (great intellectuals) so one 
always ends up being right). (Q 2, §2; CW, pp. 260-1) 
 
For Gramsci the national element refers not to some ideal or 
some form of social essence but rather to the different and specific 
histories of each social formation, and the different historicities 
expressed in the particular relations of force that determine the 
context of each society. Moreover, this is something that has to be 
taken into account in any attempt to formulate a revolutionary 
strategy that has to be national, in the sense that the point of 
departure of any revolutionary project is national, any hegemonic 
project must take into account these national peculiarities.  
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In reality, the internal relations of any nation are the result of a 
combination which is “original” and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations 
must be understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one 
wishes to dominate them and direct them. To be sure, the line of development 
is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is “national” – and it is 
from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective is 
international and cannot be otherwise. Consequently, it is necessary to study 
accurately the combination of national forces which the international class [the 
proletariat] will have to lead and develop, in accordance with the international 
perspective and directives [i.e. those of the Comintern8]. The leading class is in 
fact only such if it accurately interprets this combination – of which it is itself 
a component and precisely as such is able to give the movement a certain 
direction, within certain perspectives. (Q 14, §17; SPN, p. 240)  
 
Despite the fact that the working class is the only class truly 
internationalist in scope and in a sense the bearer of a new type of 
universalism, any strategy for working class hegemony passes 
through this attention to the national element, this need to 
‘nationalize’ itself to a certain extent: 
 
It is in the concept of hegemony that those exigencies which are national in 
character are knotted together; one can well understand how certain 
tendencies either do not mention such a concept, or merely skim over it. A 
class that is international in character has – in as much as it guides social strata 
which are narrowly national (intellectuals), and indeed frequently even less 
than national: particularistic and municipalistic (the peasants) – to ‘nationalise’ 
itself in a certain sense. (Q 14, §17; SPN, p. 241) 
 
It is also interesting that Gramsci insisted on the different 
qualities that a proletarian or popular version of collective will 
might have, emphasizing the ‘cosmopolitan’ and internationalist 
elements in the proletarian collective will. In contrast to the 
attempt by Enrico Corradini to justify nationalism and imperialist 
expansion on the basis of the character of Italy as “proletarian 
nation” and Giovanni Pascoli’s hybrid ‘proletarian nationalism’,9 
Gramsci insists on the emancipatory and transformative elements 
in a potential Italian working class “cosmopolitanism”, enhanced 
																																								 																				
8 “i.e. those of the Comintern” is an explanatory note added by the SPN translators [ed.]. 
9 On Gramsci’s interest in this attempt towards the construction of a ‘proletarian 
nationalism’, which coincided with Italian imperial ambitions at the beginning of the twentieth 
century (leading to the invasion and occupation of Libya in 1911), see the references in the text 
on the “Southern Question” (Gramsci 1978, p. 450) and in the Prison Notebooks: Q 2, §§51 and 
52 (PN1, p. 295-300). 
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by the experience of migration and based not upon some abstract 
universalism but upon the very particular universality of the 
working class condition, the universality of subalternity. It is this 
that makes it part of a broader project of social transformation and 
emancipation. 
 
At present in Italy the element ‘man’ is either ‘man-capital’ or ‘man-labour’. 
Italian expansion can only be that of ‘man-labour’ and the intellectual who 
represents ‘man-labour’ is not the traditional intellectual, swollen with rhetoric 
and literary memories of the past. Traditional Italian cosmopolitanism should 
become a modern type of cosmopolitanism, one that can assure the best 
conditions for the development of Italian ‘man-labour’ in whatever part of the 
world he happens to be. Not the citizen of the world as civis romanus or as 
Catholic, but as producer of civilization. One can therefore maintain that the 
Italian tradition is continued dialectically in the working people and their 
intellectuals, not in the traditional citizen and the traditional intellectual. The 
Italian people are the people with the greatest ‘national’ interest in a modern 
form of cosmopolitanism. Not only the worker but also the peasant, especially 
the southern peasant. It is in the tradition of the Italian people and Italian 
history to collaborate in rebuilding the world in an economically unified way 
not in order to dominate it hegemonically and appropriate the fruit of others’ 
labour but to exist and develop precisely as the Italian people. It can be shown 
that Caesar is at the source of this tradition. Nationalism of the French stamp 
is an anachronistic excrescence in Italian history, proper to people who have 
their heads turned backwards like the damned in Dante. The ‘mission’ of the 
Italian people lies in the recovery of Roman and medieval cosmopolitanism, 
but in its most modern and advanced form. Even indeed a proletarian nation, 
as Pascoli wanted; proletarian as a nation because it has been the reserve army 
of foreign capitalism, because together with the Slavic peoples it has given 
skilled workers to the entire world. For this very reason, it must join the 
modern front struggling to reorganize also the non-Italian world, which it has 
helped to create with its labour. (Q 19, §5, p. 1988; CW, pp. 246-247)  
 
Gramsci had this conception of the proletariat as the only truly 
‘national’ class – in the sense of achieving a higher form of unity of 
a society but also with an internationalist scope – already in 1919. 
In an article in October 1919 in Ordine Nuovo, Gramsci insists that: 
 
Today, the ‘national’ class is the proletariat, and the multitude of the 
workers and peasants, of Italian working people, who cannot allow the break-
up of the nation, because the unity of the State is the form of the organization 
of production and of exchange constructed by Italian labour, is the patrimony 
of social wealth that the proletarians want to bring to the Communist 
International. Only the proletarian State, the proletarian dictatorship, can 
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today stop the process of dissolution of the national unity (Gramsci 2008, p. 
19; originally in “L’Ordine Nuovo”, 4 October 1919).10 
 
It is on the basis of this assumption regarding the inability of the 
bourgeoisie to actually lead the project for the formation of such a 
national-popular will, that Gramsci assigns this task to the 
“Modern Prince” the political form of a potential working class 
hegemony. Here the emergence and formation of national-popular 
will is linked both to a process of socialist transformation at the 
economic sphere, but also to “intellectual and moral reform”:  
 
The modern Prince must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and 
organiser of an intellectual and moral reform, which also means creating the 
terrain for a subsequent development of the national-popular collective will 
towards the realisation of a superior, total form of modern civilisation.  
These two basic points – the formation of a national-popular collective will, 
of which the modern Prince is at one and the same time the organiser and the 
active, operative expression; and intellectual and moral reform – should 
structure the entire work. The concrete, programmatic points must be 
incorporated in the first part, that is they should result from the line of 
discussion “dramatically”, and not be a cold and pedantic exposition of 
arguments.  
Can there be cultural reform, and can the position of the depressed strata 
of society be improved culturally, without a previous economic reform and a 
change in their position in the social and economic fields? Intellectual and 
moral reform has to be linked with a programme of economic reform-indeed 
the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which 
every intellectual and moral reform presents itself. The modern Prince, as it 
develops, revolutionises the whole system of intellectual and moral relations, 
in that its development means precisely that any given act is seen as useful or 
harmful, as virtuous or as wicked, only in so far as it has as its point of 
reference the modern Prince itself, and helps to strengthen or to oppose it. In 
men’s consciences, the Prince takes the place of the divinity or the categorical 
imperative, and becomes the basis for a modern laicism and for a complete 
laicisation of all aspects of life and of all customary relationships (Q 13, §1; 
SPN, pp. 132-133). 
 
It is important to note that the notion of “moral and intellectual 
reform”, which Gramsci borrows from but uses beyond its original 
coinage by Ernest Renan and its reading by Sorel, not only forms 
an important part of Gramsci’s critique of Croce, but also can be 
associated with Lenin’s notion of the “cultural revolution”, 
																																								 																				
10 On Gramsci’s thinking on the “national question” see Santoro 2009. 
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referring to the extent and depth of the intellectual, ideological and 
cultural transformation that any hegemonic project requires 
(Frosini 2009; Thomas 2009, p. 420; Rapone 2011, p. 113). 
Leonardo Rapone, in his detailed study of Gramsci’s formative 
years (1914-1919) has shown that Gramsci from the beginning, 
faced with various forms of Italian nationalism had this conception 
of socialism not only as a transformation of the economic structure 
but also as a profound “intellectual renovation and moral 
transformation” (Rapone 2011, p. 109) of Italian life. It is obvious 
that here Gramsci refers to the national popular will being the 
result of a process of profound economic, social and ideological 
transformation as part of a socialist strategy and not just the 
articulation of existing national elements. It is also significant that 
in the first version of this passage in Q4, §33, instead of people-
nation the reference is to people-masses, something that 
emphasizes that for Gramsci the emergence of the contemporary 
nation is inextricably linked to the collective practices of the 
popular masses. Moreover, it stresses the fact that for Gramsci the 
“nation” in fact refers, to a great extent, to the subaltern classes 
and in particular the working class.  
Now, can we find in Gramsci’s writings a way to deal with the 
challenges associated with questions of popular sovereignty and the 
potential collective body that would express and implement it? I 
understand that a possible objection would be that Gramsci dealt 
with a period when the question was still about recognizing 
subalternity as part of nationhood, that is of actually unifying the 
nation and dealing with forms of internal exclusion, exemplified in 
the Italian case with all the contradictions of the vicissitudes and 
complexities of the Southern Question [quistione meridionale]. 
However, a closer reading of Gramsci’s various references to the 
Southern Question even in his pre-prison writings suggests that his 
conception of new process of unification under proletarian 
leadership was not just about “unity” but also overcoming forms of 
exclusion that resemble contemporary questions about decolonial 
struggles.11 Already in January 1920 Gramsci was insisting that  
																																								 																				
11 And of course there are many references in his writings for his clear support of 
decolonial struggles. See the following extract from a 1919 Ordine Nuovo article: “For several 
years we Europeans have lived at the expense of the death of the coloured peoples: 
unconscious vampires that we are, we have fed off their innocent blood. [...] But today flames 
of revolt are being fanned throughout the colonial world. This is the class struggle of the 
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The Northern bourgeoisie has subjugated the South of Italy and the 
Islands, and reduced them to exploitable colonies; by emancipating itself from 
capitalist slavery, the Northern proletariat will emancipate the Southern 
peasant masses enslaved to the banks and the parasitic industry of the North. 
The economic and political regeneration of the peasants should not be sought 
in a division of uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands, but in the solidarity of 
the industrial proletariat. This in turn needs the solidarity of the peasantry and 
has an “interest” in ensuring that capitalism is not re-born economically from 
landed property; that Southern Italy and the Islands do not become a military 
base for capitalist counter-revolution (Gramsci 1977, p. 148). 
 
Gramsci elaborates these questions more in his 1926 Some 
Aspects of the Southern Question (Gramsci 1978, pp. 441-462), which 
deals more with the complexities and difficulties in the creation of 
this new form of national-popular unity, the role of intellectuals 
and the questions that would late drive a great part of his 
elaborations around the concept of hegemony.  
At the same time, it is obvious that Gramsci’s writings dealt with 
another conjuncture which, to a certain extent, justifies Stefan 
Kipfer and Gillian Hart’s assessment that Gramsci is “both vital 
and insufficient to approach anti- and post-colonial nationalisms” 
(Kipfer and Hart 2013, p. 335). I would also agree with Kipfer and 
Hart on the need to ‘stretch’ Gramsci beyond whatever 
‘Eurocentric’ limitations his view had, into questions of “‘race’ and 
ethnicity, as well as sexuality and gender” (Kipfer and Hart 2013, p. 
332) and into a dialogue with the work of Fanon, since “[l]ike 
Gramsci, Fanon saw organic intellectuals as organizers whose 
leadership grows out of and constantly returns to the common and 
good sense of subaltern life” (Kipfer and Hart 2013, p. 333).12  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
coloured peoples against their white exploiters and murderers. It is the vast irresistible drive 
towards autonomy and independence of a whole world, with all its spiritual riches” (Gramsci 
1977, pp. 59-60). See also the following passage, again from a 1920 Ordine Nuovo article: “In 
this way the colonial populations become the foundation on which the whole edifice of 
capitalist exploitation is erected. These populations are required to donate the whole of their 
lives to the development of industrial civilization. For this they can expect no benefit in return; 
indeed, they see their own countries systematically despoiled of their natural resources, i.e. of 
the necessary conditions for their own autonomous development.” (Gramsci 1977, p. 302). 
12 In a similar tone, Ato Sekyi-Otu has suggested that “I am tempted to call Gramsci a 
precocious Fanonist. A Fanonist reading of Gramsci would indeed locate the historical 
conditions of possibility of the ‘popular-national’ as project of the modern prince in his 
portrait of the arrested development of the Italian bourgeoisie, the poverty of what he calls 
(again prefiguring Fanon) its ‘national consciousness’, its twin cultural vices of 
cosmopolitanism and narcissism, its historical inability to summon the oppressed of the 
International Gramsci Journal No. 6 (2nd Series / Seconda Serie) March / Marzo 2017	 	
	
	
79	
Yet I would like to insist that, despite certain blind spots in his 
thinking, Gramsci remains more pertinent in these contemporary 
debates, exactly because he suggested a redefinition of the popolo-
nazione based upon the determining inclusion and influence of the 
subaltern classes, of the popular masses. In a certain manner, this 
remains the case today.  
 
 
6. Reconstructing the people 
Therefore, I would suggest that the only way to rethink the 
possibility of reclaiming popular sovereignty in a manner that does 
avoid the pitfalls of both cosmopolitan universalism and 
exclusionist nationalism is by means of a redefinition of the people 
based upon the contemporary condition of subalternity in the 
context of contemporary capitalist accumulation, which in fact has 
expanded the linkages between subalternity and the subjection to 
capitalist accumulation, in both direct and indirect ways. This 
implies a redefinition of the people that delinks it from ethnicity, 
origin or common history and instead links it to common 
condition, present and struggle. It is a rather scissionist conception 
of the people because it also includes an oppositional approach to 
the ‘enemies of the people’, many of them nominally ‘members of 
the nation’. Frédéric Lordon has offered a sufficiently provocative 
description of this transformative and emancipatory conception of 
the people, in terms of what he defines as the new landscape of the 
nation, one which includes also this conception that not everyone 
can belong to the people... 
 
Here is the new landscape of nationality: Bernard Arnault? Not French. 
Cahuzac? Not French. Johnny and Depardieu who wander around the world 
like a self-service shop for passports? Not French. The Mamadous and the 
Mohammeds that toil in sweatshops, that do the work that no one else wants 
to do and pay their taxes are a thousand times more French than this race of 
masters. The blue-bloods of tax evasion, out! Passport and welcome to all the 
dark-coloured people are dwelling on this territory, those that have 
contributed twice, by their labour and their taxes to collective life, a double 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
countryside onto the stage of national regeneration. [...] Without a doubt, the conceptual 
supports of Fanon’s vision of the national, the social and the revolutionary as cognate terms of 
a new political practice, have an elective affinity with Gramsci's philosophy of praxis and its 
political implications.” (Sekyi-Otu 1996, pp. 118-119). 
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contribution that gives its own unique criterion to the belonging to what, yes, 
continues to be called a nation! (Lordon 2013) 
 
It is obvious that we need a conception of the people that is 
post-national and de-colonial. I would like to insist that we can 
have a political conception or more exactly a politically performative 
conception of the people and of – to use Gramscian terminology – 
the people-nation. We are no longer dealing with the ‘imaginary 
community’ of ‘common blood’; it is the unity in struggle of the 
subaltern classes, the unity of those that share the same problems, 
the same misery, the same hope, the same struggles. The people are 
not a common origin; they represent a common condition and 
perspective. It is an antagonistic conception of the nation that also 
demands a ‘decolonialization’ of the nation, as recognition of the 
consequences of colonialism and state racism, the struggle against 
all forms of racism within a potential alliance of the subaltern 
classes. And in this sense such a construction of the people is by 
itself a terrain of social and political antagonism. In the words of 
Stuart Hall,  
 
The capacity to constitute classes and individuals as a popular force – that is 
the nature of political and cultural struggle: to make the divided classes and the 
separated peoples – divided and separated by culture as much as by other 
factors – into a popular-democratic cultural force. (Hall 1998, pp. 452-453) 
 
Institutionally, it is based upon the offering of full political rights 
and not just ‘rights of hospitality’, to everyone living and working 
in a given territory. Culturally it answers the dangers of predefined 
cultural norms and values with a conception of democratic political 
culture as constant reconstruction and constant ‘work in progress’. 
I have stressed the element of the struggle against racism in all 
its form as an important aspect of this (re)construction of people. 
In contemporary societies, where racial divisions inside the 
working class are becoming more important, the challenge of 
overcoming racism is not just about unity of the working and 
popular masses. As Jacques Rancière has suggested, the crucial 
aspect is the identification with the cause of the other as a 
constituent moment of the production of the people. Writing 
about the importance of the movement against the French State’s 
war in Algeria as a crucial aspect of political subjectification, he 
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insists that the crucial step was the dis-identification with the 
French State that was responsible for repression, including the 
infamous 17 October 1961 police murders of more than 100 
Algerian protesters in Paris. This process of dis-identification with 
the State and the identification with the cause of the other is “the 
production of a people that is different from the people that is seen, 
talked, counted by the State, a people defined by the manifestation 
of a harm made to the constitution of a common, which constructs 
by itself another space of community” (Rancière 1997, p. 43). 
In this sense, following Deleuze we are talking about a people 
that is missing, a people that has to be produced, a people-to-come, 
“[n]ot the myth of a past people, but the story-telling of the people 
to come. The speech-act must create itself as a foreign language in 
a dominant language, precisely in order to express an impossibility 
of living under domination” (Deleuze 1989, p. 223). 
 
7. From the popolo-nazione to the historical bloc 
Consequently, we must return to Gramsci and his strategic and 
transformative conception that links the popolo-nazione and a 
potential historical bloc: 
 
If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the 
leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic 
cohesion in which feeling-passion becomes understanding and thence 
knowledge (not mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only then is 
the relationship one of representation. Only then can there take place an 
exchange of individual elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders [dirigenti] 
and led, and can the shared life be realised which alone is a social force with 
the creation of the “historical bloc” (Q 11, §67; SPN, p. 418).  
 
Now this conception of the historical bloc points to something 
more complex than the formation of the people by means of a 
process of signification that creates both a common identity and an 
opposition to a common ‘enemy’, however important such aspects 
are for this re-emergence of the people as the collective agent of 
transformation and emancipation. When dealing with the particular 
problems posed by the need to create new forms of popular unity 
between the different segments of the subaltern classes and groups 
divided as they are by ethnic or religious lines, but also by the 
institutional division between citizens and migrants as well as 
undocumented migrants, more important than the common 
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‘cultural referents’ are the collective practices, demands, strategies, 
re-writings of histories, understandings of each other, and – above 
all – common aspirations, that can indeed induce the common 
identification as people. This process also requires concrete 
struggles for the institutional forms that enable this convergence, 
especially full social and political rights, but also the forms of 
political organizing and mass political intellectuality that link this 
common condition to common hegemonic projects of 
transformation and emancipation and help the articulation of 
common struggles and alliances. In sum, it is what Gramsci tried to 
define as the “Modern Prince”, the political form of a modern 
United Front. 
Moreover, the people are not just a ‘discursive’ construction, in 
the sense of an arbitrary articulation of disparate elements into a 
temporary form of coherence. Our conception of the people in 
based upon class analysis and the potential for alliances of the 
subaltern classes. Following Poulantzas we can say the people is a 
“concept for strategy”,13 that today points to the direction of an 
actual social alliance, formed as a result of the evolution of the 
contemporary forms of capitalist accumulation that create 
‘objective’ material conditions that bring together working class 
strata with new petty bourgeois strata (in the Poulantzian sense), 
state employees and even segments of the traditional petty-
bourgeois strata as a result of the inability of contemporary 
neoliberal policies to enhance a lasting historical bloc around 
finance and multinational capitals, and the new forms of 
precariousness, flexibility and over-exploitation that have been 
intensified against both manual and intellectual labour. This indeed 
creates common demands and interests, based upon the common 
condition of labour, precariousness, unemployment, exploitation, 
increased difficulty in dealing with basic needs that, in a certain 
manner, unite the undocumented migrant with the young degree 
holder moving from unemployment into precarious part-time work 
																																								 																				
13 “The articulation of the structural determination of classes and of class positions within a 
social formation, the locus of existence of conjunctures, requires particular concepts. I shall 
call these concepts of strategy, embracing in particular such phenomena as class polarization and 
class alliance. Among these, on the side of the dominant classes, is the concept of the ‘power 
bloc’, designating a specific alliance of dominant classes and fractions; also, on the side of the 
dominated classes, the concept of the ‘people’, designating a specific alliance of these classes 
and fractions.” (Poulantzas 1975, p. 24). 
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and back into unemployment. Moreover, all these segments share 
the same contradiction running through contemporary capitalism: 
the fact that the contemporary labour force is at the same time 
more precarious, more insecure, more subject to forms of systemic 
violence, more fragmented, but also more in possession of those 
intellectual and communicative skills to realize its role as producer 
of social wealth and also to articulate demands and grievances (a 
comparison between the communication strategies of modern 
grass-root movements and certain aspects of the ingenuity of 
collective resistances by refugees and undocumented migrants can 
be really illuminating on this subject). Moreover, all these have also 
taken actual collective forms of ‘encounters’ between the different 
segments of a potential ‘people’ in contemporary movements. 
Such a perspective poses important challenges regarding the 
hegemonic aspects of such a strategy. They pose the need to 
rethink the question of re-creating the collective subject of 
emancipation to look directly at the traumas linked to oppression 
and colonialism and to reconfigure, as Houria Bouteldja has 
suggested, the ‘we’ of a new political identity to be collectively 
invented.14 They require a certain encounter between different 
currents, not only in the sense of political differences but also of 
the differences created by the reproduction of the colonial 
condition inside European States. Sadri Khiari posits this exigency 
when he calls for the construction of a “decolonial majority, which 
will be constituted by an alliance between indigenous political 
forces and non-indigenous decolonial political forces” or when he 
calls for a  
 
politics of hegemony inside the French white population, a cultural, moral, 
ideological politics in order to be, one day, conceivable that there are inside 
the white political forces decolonial composing elements that will be based 
upon a broad consensus inside the population (Bouteldja and Khiari (eds) 
2012, p. 394).  
 
																																								 																				
14 “We are the sum of our acts of cowardice and of our resistances. We will be what we will 
be worthy to be. That’s all. This is true for all of us, whites or blacks. It is there that the 
question of the big WE will be posed. The We of our encounter, the We of the surpassing of 
race and its abolition, the We of a new political identity that we must invent together, the We 
of the decolonial majority. [...] This will be the We of a revolutionary love” (Bouteldja 2016, 
pp. 139-140). 
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In a like manner it is interesting to note his suggestions on how 
the movements of what he defines as “indigenous” (namely the 
former colonial subjects living as citizens or migrants in European 
states) can contribute to the broader redefinition of movements of 
emancipation. 
 
[T]he French Indigenous but also non indigenous population suffers a 
degradation not only of its economic conditions of life but also of its entire 
life environment, a destruction of cultures, of popular knowledges, of 
traditions, of citizenship, of many social links, problems that cannot be 
resolved simply by the nationalisation of the means of production and by 
planification, either statist or self-managed. To these questions, which are 
complicated questions, I think that the indigenous are maybe more in position 
than the left or the far left to find answers, to the extent that these are 
questions that are being directly posed to them because they are the 
fundamental forms of racialisation (Bouteldja and Khiari (eds.) 2012, 396-397).  
 
And it is here that we find the importance of solidarity and 
solidarity movements to refugees, especially forms that attempt to 
create common spaces and practices of solidarity, such as self-
managed forms of hospitality that combine an immediate answer to 
a humanitarian crisis with struggles that treat refugees as collective 
subjects and not simply ‘victims’. The example of the self-managed 
Plaza Hotel in Athens and other self-managed centres that offer 
forms of hospitality to refugees is one such example. The same 
goes for all forms of common struggle across Europe, all attempts 
to create new alliances based upon a common condition of 
subalternity. From struggles for the rights of migrant labour to 
initiatives such as the ‘March for Dignity’ in France, these are all 
aspects of an attempt to ‘create people’. 
It is also important to note that this conception of the people in 
terms of a potential new “historical bloc”, in sharp contrast to both 
a certain version of ‘multiculturalism’15 that treats societies as 
simple aggregations of individuals and differences but also to the 
neo-republican version of the people as common history and 
shared values. It points to a people to be created, it accepts all the 
referents of subaltern classes as necessarily contradictory elements 
of a people to come, of a “national-popular” element that has yet 
																																								 																				
15 Especially since, as Himani Bannerji (2000) has suggested, a certain version of 
multiculturalism can be fully compatible with neoliberalism. 
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to be constructed, in a constant process of reconstruction / 
reproduction / renewal. Above all, it is a conception of the 
construction of the people that does not put class antagonism into 
brackets: rather, it takes it as a starting point.  
All this suggests that simply thinking about the rights of those 
not included in the nation, however important this might be, is not 
enough, because it does not challenge the current erosion of both 
democracy and popular sovereignty as part of very specific social 
and political strategies that enhance developments such as 
European Integration. Moreover, an emphasis upon rights, without 
a challenge of European Integration can lead either to the fruitless 
pursuit of inscribing those rights within the institutional framework 
of ‘Fortress-Europe’, in a phase when the opposite is more 
probable, or to various forms of compromises, such the current 
distinctions between ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’. And the answer to 
this impasse cannot be the invocation of a utopian ‘global’ right to 
nomadic movement – however important it is to guarantee full 
social and political rights to anyone living and working in a country 
– exactly because, as in the former case, it does not point to the 
actual political forms than can account both for the defence of 
these rights but also for the possibility to really struggle against 
racism by creating the kind of antagonistic political body that 
would re-signify both democracy and social transformation. In 
contrast, the choice of reclaiming popular sovereignty, in the form 
of ruptures with international institutional forms that undermine 
democracy, such as the EU and the Eurozone, along with 
demanding full rights and citizenship for anyone living and 
working in a country (and in general contributing to its collective 
social life), indeed offers an alternative, creating conditions for a 
broader process of trans-formation. It is exactly the prospect of 
social transformation, a common future instead of a common 
history or origin that creates a different antagonistic (and agonistic) 
form of ‘popular unity’.16 In this sense, a renewed socialist 
perspective, along the lines of such an emergence of a new 
historical bloc, is both a potential outcome and a necessary 
condition of dealing with the new forms of exclusion that emerge. 
																																								 																				
16 “Our politics must sidestep the paradigm of ‘unity’ based on ‘fragmentation or 
integration’ and instead engage in struggles based on the genuine contradictions of our 
society.” (Bannerji 2000, p. 120). 
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And it is here that we can find the basis of a new inter-nationalism, 
new forms of cooperation and solidarity. Solidarity inside a country 
is the condition for solidarity abroad; a different social and political 
configuration is the condition for a different ‘foreign policy’. 
Consequently, it is exactly the emergence of a new historical bloc 
than can actually give a different meaning to sovereignty, linking it 
to social transformation and emancipation, basing it upon a 
strategy to actually fight racism and neocolonialism and 
transforming into a form of a potentially revolutionary ‘general 
will’, representing the democratic instance that is at the heart of 
communism as a material tendency. 
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